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Abstract: The constituency statutes, passed mainly in the U.S. in the last century, allow firm directors to 
consider the interests of stakeholders other than shareholders (i.e., non-financial stakeholders) when making 
business decisions. One type of critical decisions managers make pertains to corporate tax planning, which 
creates value for the shareholders at the expense of the public interest or social welfare. In this paper, we 
investigate whether this law change with a permissive nature affects directors, and hence, managers' attitude 
towards corporate tax avoidance. Employing a staggered difference-in-difference method, we find that 
firms incorporated in the states that have adopted constituency statutes exhibit significantly higher ETRs 
based on current tax expense, but not total tax expense or cash tax paid. This causal relationship suggests 
that managers, with the permission to consider the social impact of tax avoidance, become less aggressive 
in tax planning. We further find that the effect of adoption is stronger for financially unconstrained firms 
and firms in retail businesses, where the demand (cost) for tax avoidance is lower (higher). Finally, we 
show that our main results are driven by firms located in states with a high sense of social responsibility 
and the firms with high levels of tax avoidance prior to the adoption. Overall, the findings in this paper 
suggest a positive social impact brought by the passage of constituency legislations.    
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1. Introduction 
Studies in the tax literature suggest that managers create value for the shareholders through 
engaging in tax planning activities (Desai and Dharmapala 2009; Cheng, Huang, Li, and Stanfield 2012; 
Rego and Wilson 2012; Law and Mills 2015; Edwards, Schwab, and Shevlin 2016). While managers 
prioritize shareholders’ interests, other parties (i.e., nonfinancial stakeholders), such as creditors, 
employees, customers, and the public, are also affected by decisions firms make. In particular, firms’ 
decision to avoid corporate taxes directly affects the benefits of the public community in that tax 
avoidance reduces the government’s tax revenue that may be spent on public goods (Doyle and Hughes 
2013). Accordingly, understanding how corporate attention to nonfinancial stakeholders affects a firm’s 
tax strategy is an important question for academics and business practitioners. 
Research in the accounting literature has attempted to address the relationship between corporate 
social responsibility and tax avoidance (Hoi, Wu, and Zhang 2013; Lanis and Richardson 2015; Davis, 
Guenther, Krull, and Williams 2016; Col and Patel 2019). In this study, we examine the potential impact 
of corporate attention to nonfinancial stakeholders on tax avoidance. Addressing this question is 
challenging empirically since attention to nonfinancial stakeholders is likely endogenous to tax 
avoidance. The relationship between attention to nonfinancial stakeholders and tax avoidance could be 
driven by unobserved firm characteristics that affect a firm's engagement in both less tax avoidance and 
non-financial stakeholders-friendly initiatives. Such unobserved firm-level attributes could include 
managerial short-termism (e.g., Flammer, Hong, and Minor 2019) or the interests of board committees 
(e.g., Luoma and Goodstein 1999). Furthermore, the relationship is subject to reverse causality concerns. 
For example, a negative correlation between nonfinancial stakeholder focus and tax avoidance may 
indicate that firms that aggressively avoid taxes generally focus on short term benefits and tend to ignore 
the interests of non-financial stakeholders. Therefore, it is critical to design a research that provides a 
better causal inference for the impact of a firm’s non-financial stakeholder orientation on tax avoidance.  
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This study addresses this empirical challenge by exploiting a quasi-natural experiment provided 
by the enactment of constituency statutes in 35 U.S. states between 1984 and 2007. These statutes allow 
corporate directors to consider nonfinancial stakeholders’ interests when making business decisions. They 
provide exogenous variation in the weight that U.S. public corporations attend to the interest of 
nonfinancial stakeholders. While the primary purpose of a constituency statute is to allow directors to 
consider employees' job security when assessing merger and acquisition deals, it may also have an impact 
on firms' tax planning policies. In this paper, we examine whether the adoption of constituency statutes 
provides managers a legal ground to cater to the interests of the public community, and in turn, leads to 
reduced corporate tax avoidance. Using a staggered difference-in-difference method, we can identify a 
causal relationship between the enactment of constituency statutes and tax avoidance.  
Knowing the answer to this research question is important for two reasons. First, understanding 
the consequences of a legislation change, whether intended or unintended, informs policy-makers for their 
future decision-making. While it is unlikely that states passed constituency statutes to influence firms’ tax 
behaviors, unintended tax consequences, if there is any, are certainly of policy-makers’ interest as tax is 
the fuel that keeps the government running. To the extent that firms respond to constituency statutes by 
paying more taxes, proponents of such statutes would identify another reason to keep proposing legal 
changes of a similar nature. Second, in the accounting literature regarding corporate social responsibility, 
there has been a debate on whether socially responsible firms pay more taxes than socially irresponsible 
ones. For example, Hoi et al. (2013) show that firms with excessive irresponsible CSR activities are more 
aggressive in avoiding taxes, while Davis et al. (2016) find that firms with good CSR records also engage 
in more tax avoidance. Taken together, it remains an open question whether an enhanced sense of social 
responsibility results in lower levels of tax avoidance, with evidence of causal relationship missing in 
particular.  
The answer to the research question is also unclear ex-ante. On the one hand, the adoption of 
constituency statutes provides directors/managers legal support to consider the social impact of tax 
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avoidance and protects them against the potential legal charges from the shareholders when their chosen 
level of tax avoidance differs from the one expected by the shareholders. Thus, to the extent that 
directors/managers see tax avoidance as socially irresponsible but are obligated to do so due to their 
fiduciary duty to maximize shareholder value, the adoption of constituency statues should reduce the level 
of tax avoidance. Furthermore, corporate directors seize the opportunity provided by the enactment of 
constituency statutes to change director board composition and structure (Luoma and Goodstein 1999) 
and redesign executive compensation criteria (Flammer et al. 2019). By doing so, they can develop a 
corporate culture attending to the interest of both financial and nonfinancial stakeholders and supporting 
less aggressive tax avoidance (Col and Patel 2019). 
On the other hand, however, constituency statutes are permissive, rather than mandatory, in 
nature. Directors/managers are not required to consider the social impact of tax avoidance. They may not 
necessarily refrain from conducting aggressive tax avoidance if they do not personally see the benefits of 
reducing tax avoidance, or if they face overwhelming pressures from their fiduciary duty. For those 
companies that have not established a culture attending to the interest of nonfinancial stakeholders, due to 
the permissive nature, constituency statutes may have no impact on tax avoidance. For those companies 
with a culture attending to the interest of both financial and nonfinancial stakeholders, companies’ 
attention to nonfinancial stakeholders may divert valuable resources away from profit-maximizing 
activities (Flammer and Kacperczyk 2016). In order to meet the short-term requirements from financial 
stakeholders (e.g., meet or beat analysts' quarterly earnings expectations), managers may engage in more 
aggressive tax-saving activities to make up for the profit loss resulting from diverting valuable resources 
for attending to non-financial stakeholders. Alternatively, firms that are friendly to non-financial 
stakeholders may not see paying taxes as the best way to deliver their social responsibilities. Firms with 
this mentality may prefer contributing resources to socially responsible initiatives on their own and see 
saving taxes as one way to accumulate such resources. The main finding in Davis et al. (2016) provides 
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implicit support for this argument. In either case, the enactment of constituency statutes may cause firms 
to become more aggressive in tax avoidance.  
Using a staggered difference-in-difference method, we find robust empirical evidence that firms 
reduce the level of tax avoidance after the adoption of the constituency statute. Specifically, over a ten-
year window centered at the adoption year2, firms’ ETR, which is based on current tax expense (TXC)3, 
increases by 2.8 percentage points4, which is economically significant given an average Current ETR of 
27.8% over our sample period. We also use Cash (GAAP) ETR as an alternative measure of tax 
avoidance and find a weak (no) result. Obtaining result with Current ETR but not Cash ETR is likely due 
to data limit on cash taxes paid (TXPD) in Compustat; U.S. firms started reporting TXPD in 1987, a year 
around which many states adopted the legislation.   
Based on the argument that firms faced with financial constraints have a higher demand for tax 
avoidance (Law and Mills 2015; Edwards et al. 2016), we further find that the increase in ETR is driven 
by the firms that are less financially constrained, where the level of financial constraints is proxied by the 
WW index (Whited and Wu 2006). The finding of financial constraints suggests that the social impact of 
tax avoidance is ignored with the urge to generate cash flows internally through tax avoidance and is 
consistent with the non-mandatory nature of constituency statutes.  In addition, consistent with the notion 
that the firms in the retail sector bear a higher cost in tax avoidance (Hanlon and Slemrod 2009), we also 
find that retail firms drive the increase in ETR.  
Furthermore, we examine the underlying assumption that managers with an inherent sense of 
social responsibility would respond more strongly to the adoption of constituency statutes. In other words, 
those managers engage in aggressive tax avoidance because they are obligated by their fiduciary duty to 
the shareholders and their preferred level of tax planning would be lower without such an obligation. 
                                                          
2. The adoption year is omitted from the window in order to have a clearer identification. 
3 We later refer to it as “Current ETR” for brevity. 
4. The estimation of 2.8 percentage points is based on an unweighted regression. When weighted regression is used, 
the increase is 5.3 percentage points. 
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Following Hasan, Hoi, Wu, and Zhang (2017), we use state-level social capital and organ donation as 
proxies for a local sense of social responsibility and find that our main result is driven by firms 
headquartered in the states where the sense of social responsibility is higher. Finally, we show that our 
main results are driven by the firms that exhibit higher levels of tax avoidance prior to the adoption of 
constituency statutes, as those firms have both the motivation and the flexibility to abandon tax avoiding 
strategies.    
 Our paper makes two important contributions. First, we show that legislation changes in favor of 
non-financial stakeholders’ interest has an impact on corporate tax avoidance. This finding informs policy 
makers for their future decisions regardless whether such an impact aligns with their original intention in 
making and adopting constituency statutes. Second, we contribute to the tax literature in accounting 
research. That is, complementing the mixed conclusions drawn by Hoi et al. (2013) and Davis et al. 
(2016), we provide large-sample evidence of a causal relationship between a promoted sense of social 
responsibility and corporate tax avoidance. Namely, we show that allowing directors/managers to 
consider the social impact of tax avoidance, in addition to their fiduciary duty to the shareholders, deters 
tax avoidance. It implies that directors/managers do see paying corporate taxes as a social responsibility, 
and would fulfill such responsibility when they are legally permitted to. This finding enriches researchers’ 
understanding of corporate tax avoidance from a social perspective.  
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2. Institutional background, prior literature, and hypotheses development 
According to the shareholder primacy argument made by Adolf A. Berle in the 1930s, managers 
at public corporations should direct their efforts exclusively to maximizing shareholders’ value. This 
view, which sees shareholders as the only trustees managers serve to, was challenged at the time by E. 
Merrick Dodd, who advocated that corporations should not only perform as a profit-making function but 
also cater to the interests of other stakeholders, including creditors, employees, suppliers, customers, and 
the society as a whole. The debate between Berle and Dodd has lasted ever since. The takeover waves in 
the 1980s, which gleaned profits for the acquirers and target shareholders but created losses for other 
stakeholders, reignited the debate on whether managers should consider other stakeholders’ interests 
when making decisions. Practitioners and academics argue that takeovers create value for shareholders 
through expropriating rents from other corporate stakeholders such as employees and suppliers. In 
particular, Shleifer and Summers (1988) argue that hostile takeovers break the implicit contracts between 
managers and employees and lead to drastic cuts in employment and wages. 
Concurrent with the anti-takeover laws that were legislated in response to the takeover waves, 
many states adopted constituency statutes in the 1980s and 1990s. Between 1984 and 2007, 35 states in 
the U.S. adopted constituency statutes, which in general allow managers and directors of public 
corporations to consider an expanded group of interests when making decisions concerning the course of 
the corporation’s business (Ortz 1992). For example, the original Pennsylvania statute says, "the board of 
directors…may, in considering the best interests of the corporation, consider the effects of any action 
upon employees, suppliers, and customers of the corporation, communities in which offices or other 
establishments of the corporation are located, and all other pertinent factors." In short, constituency 
statutes provide directors, and in turn, managers, a legal ground to consider other stakeholders’ interests, 
which do not always align with the interests of the shareholders. 
The impact of constituency statutes on firms’ governance and operations has been studied in the 
literature. Luoma and Goodstein (1999) find that firms incorporated in states that have adopted 
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constituency statutes have more non-shareholder stakeholders on their board. Using the staggered passage 
of constituency statutes as a natural experiment, Flammer and Kacperczyk (2016) find that the enactment 
of constituency statutes leads to increased innovation, measured in terms of the number of patents and 
citations per patent. They interpret theirs as evidence that constituency statutes provide managers with 
legal support to engage in activities that promote innovation, which benefits non-financial stakeholders 
and does not usually pay off in the short run. Without such legal support, pressure from shareholders may 
prevent managers from investing in innovations. More recently, Gao, Li, and Ma (2018) find that the cost 
of debt decreases for the firms incorporated in states that have passed constituency statutes, an effect that 
is stronger for the firms whose stakeholders’ interests are more likely ignored. Consistently, 
Radhakrishnan, Wang, and Wang (2019) find that those firms reduce the level of conservatism in their 
financial reporting. They argue that accounting conservatism, which imposes higher standards for the 
verification for good news than for bad news, protects creditors and other non-financial stakeholders from 
downside risk. After the passage of constituency statutes, the demand for accounting conservatism 
decreases as managers are legally endorsed to pay attention to the interests of other stakeholders.   
One business decision that would create a conflict of interests between shareholders and the other 
stakeholders is corporate tax avoidance. On the one hand, tax avoidance likely creates firm value as it 
generates additional after-tax cash flows. In the tax literature, many studies address this point from an 
incentive perspective. For example, based on the notion that equity incentives (e.g., stock options) induce 
managers to work more diligently for the firm, Rego and Wilson (2012) find a positive association 
between equity incentive and tax avoidance. Consistently, Cheng et al. (2012) document that firms 
targeted by hedge fund activists experience increases in tax avoidance, suggesting a sub-optimal level of 
tax avoidance before the intervention. Financially constrained firms can use tax avoidance as a channel to 
save cash and finance positive NPV projects that they cannot afford otherwise (Edwards et al. 2016; Law 
and Mills 2015). For financially constrained firms, the ability to finance and launch positive NPV projects 
certainly creates value.  
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On the other hand, however, other stakeholders may not necessarily benefit from tax avoidance. 
For example, the financial interests of employees and suppliers are usually stable as long as the firm 
continues to operate, and additional profits obtained through avoiding taxes likely do not matter to these 
constituents. Unlike employees and suppliers, customers, and the government, as constituents of the 
society, would likely hurt from firms avoiding corporate taxes. The government raises tax revenue to 
finance public goods that are consumed by the entire society, which includes both existing and potential 
customers. In 2017, corporate income taxes constituted 8.9% of the total U.S. government revenues 
(Statista). Therefore, corporate tax avoidance reduces the government's capacity to provide public 
services, and society would eventually bear the cost. Although employing tax strategies to maximize 
shareholder value is not necessarily unethical, it would still damper a firm's reputation as a decent 
corporate citizen, especially for those that deal directly with their customers. Anecdotes suggest that 
corporate tax avoidance could lead to customer backlash. For example, The Ethical Consumer magazine 
in the U.K. called for a boycott against Amazon after learning that the firm paid only 0.1% of its U.K. 
sales in taxes. In 2015, Amazon committed to abandoning tax strategies that succeeded in legally 
reducing its tax bills (Dyreng, Hoopes, and Wilde 2016). 
While anecdotes suggest that public pressure leads firms to pay more taxes, it is still unclear 
whether socially responsible firms pay more taxes without external intervention. In the literature, 
continuous attempts have been made to examine this empirical question but the findings remain mixed. 
Using firms’ tax disputes as a proxy for tax avoidance, Lanis and Richardson (2015) find that a higher 
level of CSR performance is related to a lower likelihood of tax avoidance. Similarly, Hoi et al. (2013) 
find that firms with excessive irresponsible CSR activities are more likely engaged in tax-sheltering 
activities. In contrast, Davis et al. (2016) report a negative relation between CSR and Cash ETR, 
suggesting that socially responsible firms also avoid more taxes. In a recent study, Col and Patel (2019) 
find that firms CSR ratings increase substantially after they first open tax haven affiliates, suggesting that 
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they anticipate tax avoidance to bring a negative social perception on them and actively manage their 
reputation through engaging in positive CSR activities.  
Since directors and managers set the tone at the top for a firm’s operations, whether socially 
responsible firms pay more taxes essentially boils down to whether directors and managers regard paying 
the fair share of taxes as their social responsibility. The adoption of constituency statutes allows directors 
to consider the interests of the society when making business decisions, including decisions with regard to 
tax planning. If directors and managers see paying corporate taxes as a socially responsible action but are 
obligated to avoid more taxes than they would like to due to the pressure exerted from the shareholders, 
the adoption of constituency statutes would lend them legal protection so they can refrain from engaging 
in aggressive tax avoidance. Thus, we expect the level of tax avoidance to decrease after the adoption.  
Nevertheless, a deterring effect of constituency statutes on tax avoidance may not necessarily 
exist. First of all, those statutes are usually broadly worded without specifying the firm decisions 
pertaining to which other stakeholders’ interests may be considered. In the context of this study, we are 
not aware of any statute that explicitly allows managers to evaluate the social impact of corporate tax 
avoidance. Also, constituency statues appear to have had very little use in the courtroom other than for 
merger and acquisition cases (Ortz 1992), and the statutes do not seem to have been decisive for the 
outcome in cases that do mention such statutes (McDonnell 2004). More importantly, given the 
permissive nature of the statutes, directors, and hence managers, are only allowed, rather than required, to 
accommodate the interests of the community. To the extent that directors/managers do not have an 
inherent sense of social responsibility, or their urge to fulfill social responsibilities is overridden by the 
fiduciary duties to the shareholders, the adoption of constituency statutes may not result in lower levels of 
tax avoidance.  
From a financial reporting standpoint, a heighted sense of social responsibility may lead 
managers to use tax avoidance as a tool to manage earnings. Flammer and Kacperczyk (2016) argue that 
engaging in socially responsible activities may divert valuable resource away from profit-maximizing 
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activities. As such, managers may find it more difficult to meet or beat earnings targets due to profits lost 
to investments in socially responsible activities. As a result, managers may turn to tax avoidance as their 
last chance to manage earnings (Dhaliwal, Gleason, and Mills 2004). Lastly, it is also possible that 
directors/managers possess a sense of social responsibility but do not see paying taxes as an activity that 
benefits society as a whole. Studies investigating the relation between CSR and tax avoidance usually 
frame these two as either substitutes or complements. While a complementary relation suggests that firms 
with good CSR records should consistently avoid less tax, a substitutive relation suggests that those firms 
may instead invest their tax savings in socially responsible activities themselves via better compensating 
their employees or donating to charities, as they believe firms are more efficient than governments in 
allocating resources (Davis et al. 2016; McGee 2010; Lantos 2001). In a nutshell, an empirical 
investigation is warranted to shed light on the impact that constituency statutes have on corporate tax 
avoidance. 
H1: The level of tax avoidance decreases after the adoption of constituency statutes. 
 Financially constrained firms demonstrate higher levels of tax avoidance (Law and Mills 2015; 
Edwards et al. 2016). For those firms, external financing is inaccessibly expensive and therefore funding 
positive NPV projects with funds internally generated via avoiding taxes is a forced alternative. Although 
constituency statutes allow directors/managers to consider the social impact of tax avoidance, serving the 
interests of the shareholders is still likely the priority, particularly with the permissive nature of the 
statutes. Under financial constraints, shareholders would have a stronger demand for tax avoidance 
because otherwise, the firm would have to forgo value-creating investment opportunities. As a result, 
directors/managers may barely consider the social impact of tax avoidance, even when constituency 
statutes allow them to do so. Therefore, we expect the effect stated in H1 to be stronger for financially 
unconstrained firms.  
 H1a: The level of tax avoidance decreases after the adoption of constituency statutes, and this 
effect is stronger for the firms that are not financially constrained.     
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 Firms in retail businesses may face a heightened cost in tax avoidance as a negative public image 
often leads to customer backlash. For example, after being exposed to have paid little tax relative to its 
profits made in the UK, Starbucks voluntarily paid 10 million in GBP to the UK tax authority as an effort 
to save its public image and avoid customer boycott. Findings reported by prior studies are consistent 
with this observation. For instance, Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) find that stock price reaction to news 
about corporate tax aggressiveness is more negative for firms in the retail sector.  
 We argue that retail firms should be more sensitive to the adoption of constituency statutes as 
being a responsible corporate citizen paying their fair share of taxes matters critically to their popularity 
among media and individual customers. In addition, the adoption of constituency statutes would raise the 
entire society’s awareness of firms’ social responsibility, especially for retail firms with a more visible 
public image. Therefore, we expect the effect stated in H1 to be stronger for retail firms. 
 H1b: The level of tax avoidance decreases after the adoption of constituency statutes, and this 
effect is stronger for the firms that are in the retail sector.     
 The assumption underlying H1 is that managers have an inherent motivation to accommodate 
social benefits when making corporate decisions and the adoption of constituency statutes lends them 
legal support not to engage in excessive tax avoidance. In that sense, managers with a stronger sense of 
social responsibility should have a stronger response to the passage constituency legislation. Although 
managers' social attitude is hard to observe, numerous studies show that local social norms affect 
individuals’ decision-making (e.g., Cialdini and Goldstein 2004; Hoi, Wu, and Zhang 2018; Hasan, Hoi, 
Wu, and Zhang 2017; Boone, Khurana and Raman 2013; McGuire, Omer, and Sharp 2012; Hilary and 
Hui 2009).  
For example, Hoi, Wu, and Zhang (2018) find that the level of social capital, as captured by the 
strength of civic norms and density of social networks, is positively related to firms' CSR activities. Using 
the same data, Hasan et al. (2017) find a negative association between local-level social capital and tax 
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avoidance, consistent with the notion that the sense of social responsibility and collectivism discourages 
managers from engaging in corporate tax avoidance. Therefore, to the extent that managers view paying 
taxes as a socially responsible activity, we expect the effect stated in H1 to concentrate on the firms 
headquartered in the states where the sense of social responsibility is high.  
H1c: The level of tax avoidance decreases after the adoption of constituency statutes, and this 
effect is stronger for the firms headquartered in the states with a high sense of social responsibility.      
 If a promoted sense of social responsibility would induce managers to pay more taxes, this 
inducing effect should be stronger for the firms that have avoided more taxes before the adoption of 
constituency statutes, relative to their industry peers. There are two reasons. First, firms avoiding more 
taxes relative to their peers likely employ more tax planning strategies and thus would have more 
flexibility to unwind those strategies when they intend to lower the level of tax avoidance. For instance, 
after being accused of having paid very little tax in the U.K., Starbucks said it would not claim tax 
deductions for royalties, coffee purchases, interest on intercompany loans, or capital allowances, and 
would not carry forward tax losses,5 all of which are common tax planning practices. Second, firms 
hesitate to appear more aggressive in tax planning than their peers. Recent studies find that firms 
benchmark their level of tax avoidance against their competitors and adjust their tax planning strategies to 
avoid standing out as a tax avoider. Using executive turnover as exogenous shocks, Bird, Edwards, and 
Ruchti (2018) find that peer firms respond to shocks in tax behavior by changing their GAAP ETR in the 
same direction. Similarly, using two distinct research settings, Armstrong, Glaeser, and Kepler (2019) 
find that firms exhibit strategic reactions to changes in their industry-competitors tax planning. In sum, 
we expect the effect stated in H1 to be stronger for the firms that have avoided more taxes prior to the 
adoption of constituency statutes. 
                                                          
5 See Financial Times article at https://www.ft.com/content/ac97bb1e-3fa5-11e2-b0ce-00144feabdc0. 
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 H1d: The level of tax avoidance decreases after the adoption of constituency statutes, and this 
effect is stronger for the firms that have avoided more taxes before the adoption.     
3. Research design and sample selection  
3.1 Regression Model 
Since constituency statutes have been adopted in different years across the states, we employ a 
staggered difference-in-difference model to test the hypotheses. The model is as follows: 
𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽 × 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑘,𝑡 + ∑𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + ɛ   (1) 
 Where 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛼𝑡 are firm and year fixed-effects. Firm-fixed effects are required to establish a 
staggered difference-in-difference model. ETR stands for a one-year effective tax rate, which is measured 
based on cash tax paid (TXPD), total tax expense (TXT), or current tax expense (TXC). A higher ETR 
indicates a lower level of tax avoidance. Constituency, the variable of interest, is a binary variable equal 
to 1 for the five years following the adoption of constituency statute in state k6, and zero for the five years 
prior to the adoption. The year of adoption is excluded from the sample. The states that have never passed 
the legislation are also excluded from the sample. We limit our testing period to a ten-year window for 
each adopting state to 1) obtain a balanced sample between treated and control firms, and 2) to reduce the 
concern that long-term economic factors unrelated to the adoption of constituency statutes may influence 
our results. Due to the staggered difference-in-difference setting, firms before the adoption are used as 
their own controls. According to H1, we expect 𝛽 to be positive.  
 To test H1a, we split the sample into high/low financial constraints partitions, using WW index. 
WW index is defined in Appendix A. We expect β to be stronger for the group with a lower level of 
financial constraints.  
                                                          
6 Following prior studies on staggered legislation adoptions across the states in the U.S., such as Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (2003), I use the state of incorporation to define k.  
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 To test H1b, we separate our firms in the retail industry based on Fama-French 12 and 17 
industries. We do not use Fama-French 30 or 48 industries as doing so results in two subsamples too 
much different in size. We expect β to be stronger for the firms in the retail industry. When FF12 is used, 
firms under the category of “Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services” are defined as retail firms. When 
FF17 is used, those under the category of “Retail Stores” are defined as retail firms. 
 To test H1c, we follow Hasan et al. (2017) and split our sample into high/low social responsibility 
partitions, based on state-level social capital7 and per capita organ donation8. We expect β to be stronger 
for the group with a higher level of social responsibility.  
 To test H1d, we calculate a firm’s three-year Current ETR prior to the adoption of constituency 
statutes and compare that to the industry median based on Fama-French 48 industries. The firms with a 
Current ETR below (above) the median are marked as having a high (low) level of prior tax avoidance. 
We expect β to be stronger for the group with a higher level of prior tax avoidance.   
 Our sample period starts from 1979, 5 years prior to the first adoption of constituency statute in 
Ohio, and ends in 2012, 5 years after the last adoption in Nebraska. Following prior studies in tax 
avoidance, we exclude the firm-years with non-positive pretax book income (PI), adjusted for special 
items (SPI). We also remove firms in the financial and utility industries. Finally, we require firms to have 
at least 10 million in total assets (AT). ETR variables are winsorized at 0 and 1, and all the continuous 
variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%.   
Data availability for the ETR variables varies. In the literature, Cash ETR has been the primary 
measure of tax avoidance, which is cash tax paid (TXPD) scaled by pre-tax book income (PI), adjusted 
for special items (SPI). Since U.S. firms are required to disclose TXPD only after 1987, the Cash ETR 
sample has fewer observations than the samples for GAAP ETR and the ETR based on current tax 
                                                          
7 Social capital data are obtained from the website of Northeast Regional Center for Rural Development (NRCRD). 
8 Organ donation data are obtained from the website of Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN).  
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expense (TXC), which we refer to as Current ETR. The main difference between GAAP and Cash ETR is 
that GAAP ETR does not reflect tax avoided using deferral-based strategies. There are two primary 
differences between Current ETR and Cash ETR; Cash ETR excludes unrecognized tax benefit (UTB) 
and tax expense on employee stock options, while Current ETR does not. The sample size for Current 
ETR and GAAP ETR is 10,167 and 9,162, respectively, whereas the sample size for Cash ETR is 5,355. 
Due to the data availability on Cash ETR and the fact that GAAP ETR does not capture deferral-based tax 
avoidance, we see the Current ETR as the most appropriate measure for this study.   
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4. Descriptive statistics and regression results 
 Table 1 shows the years of adoption for the constituency statutes in each of the 35 states. Most of 
the adoptions took place in the 1980s and early 1990s, which coincided with the 1986 tax reform that 
reduced the statutory corporate tax rate to 35%. Therefore, it is critical that year fixed-effects are 
included.  
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
Table 2 shows the sample composition for the Current ETR sample. 33 of the 35 adopting states 
are covered by our sample. The majority of the sample comes from New York, Massachusetts, 
Pennsylvania, Ohio, New Jersey, Florida, Georgia, Minnesota, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin. 
Noticeably, Delaware is not included in the sample. Among the 10,167 observations, 5,297 are treated 
observations and 4,870 are control observations.     
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics on the variables. Current ETR, GAAP ETR, and Cash ETR 
have means of 27.8%, 35.7%, and 31.8%, respectively.  
 [Insert Table 3 Here] 
 Table 4, Panel A presents the results for the baseline regression model (Equation 1). Columns (1) 
to (3) show the results from unweighted regressions, while Columns (4) to (6) show the results from 
weighted regressions. Guenther (2018) suggests that weighting makes a difference when the sub-groups 
in a sample have different amounts of observations. In our case, the number of observations differs 
significantly across states (e.g., 1,514 in New York vs. 3 in Idaho). Without weighting, New York 
observations would have a dominating impact on the results whereas it makes more sense to let each state 
have the same influence. Thus, we assign a weight of 1/N to each observation, with N being the number 
of observations in a state.  
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 In unweighted regressions, a positive and significant coefficient on Constituency (β=0.028, 
t=2.56) is only observed when Current ETR is used. Results are insignificant when GAAP or Cash ETR is 
used. When weighted regressions are used, the coefficient is still positive and significant (β=0.053, 
t=2.34) with Current ETR, and the coefficient becomes weakly significant (β=0.054, t=1.73) when Cash 
ETR is used. Overall, the results in Table 4 show that the adoption of constituency statutes leads firms’ 
Current ETR to increase, suggesting reduced tax avoidance.    
 [Insert Table 4 Here] 
 Table 5 shows the results for the financial constraints partitions based on weighted regressions. 
Consistent with H1a, the coefficient on Constituency is positive and significant (β=0.068, t=2.21) only 
when the level of financial constraints is low, which suggests that managers would only forgo aggressive 
tax avoidance when there is little need to yield cash flows internally through tax planning.   
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
 Table 6 shows the results for the retail sector partitions based on weighted regressions, where the 
retail sector is defined using Fama-French 12 and 17 industry classifications. Consistent with H1b, the 
coefficient on Constituency is positive and significant only for retail firms (β=0.109, t=3.59 for FF12; 
β=0.133, t=3.06 for FF17), suggesting that firms in the retail sector are more responsive to the adoption of 
constituency statutes.  
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
 Table 7 shows the results for the social responsibility partitions based on weighted regressions, 
where social responsibility is proxied by state-level social capital and state-level per capita organ 
donation. Consistent with H1c, the coefficient on Constituency is only positive and significant (β=0.07, 
t=2.34 for social capital; β=0.065, t=2.25 for organ donation) when the level of social responsibility is 
high. This is consistent with the notion that managers with an inherent sense of social responsibility are 
more likely to reduce the level of tax avoidance after the adoption of constituency statutes.      
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[Insert Table 7 Here] 
 
 Table 8 shows the results for the prior tax avoidance partitions based on weighted regressions, 
where the level of prior tax avoidance is defined based on a firm’s degree of tax avoidance relative to its 
industry peers during the three years prior to the adoption. Consistent with H1d, the coefficient on 
Constituency is only positive and significant (β=0.065, t=3.63) when the level of prior tax avoidance is 
high. This is consistent with the notion that firms that have avoided more taxes prior to the adoption of 
constituency statutes have both the flexibility and the motivation to reduce the level of tax avoidance. 
[Insert Table 8 Here] 
 
5. Robustness checks 
5.1 Anti-Takeover Law Falsification Test 
In response to the hostile takeover waves, many of the states adopted anti-takeover legislation in 
the late 1980s, in conjunction with the passage of constituency statutes. For example, Arizona passed both 
legislations in 1987. Prior studies have examined the impact of anti-takeover laws on firm performance 
(e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan 2003; Atanassov 2013). To assess the possibility that the main results 
actually reflect the effect of anti-takeover laws, we perform a falsification test where we replace the 
treatment with the passage of anti-takeover legislation. Specifically, we take the Current ETR sample 
used to test H1 (10,167 observations) and replace the treatment variable based on the years in which anti-
takeover laws were passed. Notice that all the states included in this sample have passed constituency 
statute at some point but not all of them have passed anti-takeover law. For the states that have never had 
anti-takeover law, the treatment variable is always zero.  
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Table 9 shows the results for the falsification test. Using unweighted regression, the treatment 
variable is weakly significant (β=0.016, t=1.72). Compare that to the coefficient in Table 4, Column (1): 
β=0.028, t=2.56. When weighted regression is used, the coefficient is not significant at all (β=0.03, 
t=1.32). Therefore, the falsification test confirms that our main results are not a reflection of the passage 
of anti-takeover laws.       
[Insert Table 9 Here] 
5.2 Randomizing adoption years 
To verify that the results are truly due to the staggered adoptions of constituency statutes rather 
than some unidentified long-term effects, we randomly assign the adoption years to the 35 adopting states 
and re-estimate the regression for Current ETR for multiple times. We are unable to reproduce the main 
result with randomized adoption years.   
We also replace all the adoption years with the years immediately before and after. When 
adoption years are replaced with the years before them, the coefficient of Constituency becomes 
insignificant (β=-0.001, t=-0.20 for unweighted regression and β=-0.001, t=-0.04 for weighted 
regression). Similarly, when adoption years are replace with the years after them, the coefficient is 
insignificant (β=0.003, t=0.31 for unweighted regression and β=0.004, t=0.17 for weighted regression). 
5.3 Testing parallel trend 
Testing whether treated firms already exhibit a different trend relative to control firms is a 
common robustness test when difference-in-difference is used. For this study in particular, if treated firms 
already show an up-going trend in ETR before the passage of the legislation, our main results may be 
spurious. To alleviate this concern, we perform a parallel test. Table 10 shows the results.  Pre3, Pre2, and 
Pre1 represent the three years leading up to the adoption of constituency statute, respectively. Similarly, 
Post1, Post2, and Post3 represent the three years following the adoption. When unweighted regression is 
used, none of the Pre variables is significant, whereas Post1 and Post3 are weakly significant. When 
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weighted regression is used, all of those variables are insignificant, except for Pre1, which is negative and 
significant. Overall, there is no evidence that treated firms already exhibit an increasing trend in ETR 
prior to the adoption.  
[Insert Table 10 Here] 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper investigates the effect of constituency statutes on corporate tax avoidance. Using the 
staggered adoptions of the statute across the U.S., we find evidence that firms’ ETR based on current tax 
expense increases after the adoption, consistent with the idea that endorsing managers with the legal 
support to cater to the interests of the society has a deterring effect on corporate tax avoidance. We further 
find that the result is stronger for the firms with a lower level of financial constraints, firms operating in 
the retail sector, firms headquartered in the states with a higher sense of social responsibility, and firms 
that have avoided more taxes prior to the adoption. Our main results withstand a battery of robustness 
tests. Overall, results from our study suggest a positive social impact brought by the adoption of 
constituency statutes and a causal relationship between a promoted sense of social responsibility and 
reduced corporate tax avoidance. 
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Appendix A 
 
Variables Definition 
Current ETR 
Current Income Tax Expense (TXC) scaled by Pretax Book Income (PI) less Special 
Items (SPI), winsorized at [0,1] 
GAAP ETR 
Total Income Tax Expense (TXT) scaled by Pretax Book Income (PI) less Special 
Items (SPI), winsorized at [0,1] 
Cash ETR 
Cash Tax Paid (TXPD) scaled by Pretax Book Income (PI) less Special Items (SPI), 
winsorized at [0,1] 
Constituency 
A binary variable equal to one if the state of incorporation has passed constituency 
statute in this year, 0 otherwise. 
Size  The logarithm of Total Assets (AT) 
PP&E PPENT scaled by lagged AT 
NOL Indicator variable equal to one if TLCF is non-zero and non-missing, zero otherwise 
ΔNOL the change in the amount of NOL 
R&D XRD scaled by lagged AT, with missing XRD replaced with zero 
MTB Market-to-book ratio, calculated as (CSHO*PRCC_F)/CEQ 
Sales growth The change in SALE scaled by lagged SALE 
Intangible INTAN scaled by lagged AT 
Leverage Sum of DLTT and DLC scaled by lagged AT 
Pretax ROA Pretax book income (PI) scaled by lagged AT 
Capital 
expenditure 
CAPX scaled by AT 
WW index  
Financial constraint index developed by Whited and Wu (2006), calculated as -
0.091*(IB+DP)/AT-0.062*dividend paying indicator+0.021*DLTT/AT-
0.044*Ln(AT)+0.102*Average yearly sales growth at three-digit SIC level-
0.035*(firm's sales growth). 
Social capital 
State level social capital data obtained from the Northeast Regional Center for Rural 
Development (NRCRD) at the Pennsylvania State University. 
Organ donation 
State level organ donation data in the United States from the Organ Procurement and 
Transplantation Network (OPTN). 
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Table 1 List of States with Constituency Statutes 
 
State Year  State Year 
Ohio 1984  Massachusetts 1989 
Illinois 1985  Missouri 1989 
Maine 1986  New Jersey 1989 
Arizona 1987  Oregon 1989 
Minnesota 1987  Mississippi 1990 
New Mexico 1987  Pennsylvania 1990 
New York 1987  Rhode Island 1990 
Wisconsin 1987  South Dakota 1990 
Idaho 1988  Wyoming 1990 
Louisiana 1988  Nevada 1991 
Tennessee 1988  North Carolina 1993 
Virginia 1988  North Dakota 1993 
Florida 1989  Connecticut 1997 
Georgia 1989  Vermont 1998 
Hawaii 1989  Maryland 1999 
Indiana 1989  Texas 2006 
Iowa 1989  Nebraska 2007 
Kentucky 1989    
  
This table shows the years of adoption of constituency statutes in each of states. Source: Flammer and 
Kacperczyk (2008), p1988. Nebraska was added to this table. 
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Table 2 Sample Composition 
State  N Before  After 
Arizona  44 24 20 
Connecticut 129 75 54 
Florida 539 234 305 
Georgia 467 221 246 
Hawaii 28 19 9 
Iowa 74 40 34 
Idaho 3 2 1 
Illinois 118 54 64 
Indiana 391 197 194 
Kentucky 40 24 16 
Louisiana 84 41 43 
Massachusetts 827 409 418 
Maryland 332 172 160 
Maine 53 30 23 
Minnesota 566 245 321 
Missouri 145 62 83 
Mississippi 24 11 13 
North Carolina 319 134 185 
Nebraska 22 12 10 
New Jersey 626 317 309 
New Mexico 13 6 7 
Nevada 621 223 398 
New York 1,514 780 734 
Ohio 745 360 385 
Oregon 142 67 75 
Pennsylvania 824 403 421 
Rhode Island 52 25 27 
South Dakota 6 0 6 
Tennessee 191 86 105 
Texas 415 231 184 
Virginia 427 210 217 
Wisconsin 367 149 218 
Wyoming 19 7 12 
Total 10,167 4,870 5,297 
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Table 3 Descriptive Statistics 
 
  N Mean SD Q1 Median Q3 
Primary Variables             
Current ETR 10,167 0.278 0.223 0.054 0.302 0.407 
GAAP ETR 9,162 0.357 0.159 0.308 0.377 0.429 
Cash ETR 5,355 0.318 0.225 0.168 0.307 0.409 
Constituency 10,167 0.521 0.499 0 1 1 
Control Variables             
Size 10,167 4.794 1.723 3.457 4.529 5.772 
PP&E 10,167 0.372 0.261 0.179 0.311 0.506 
ΔNOL 10,167 0.0003 0.009 0 0 0 
NOL 10,167 0.215 0.411 0 0 1 
R&D 10,167 0.026 0.052 0 0 0.029 
MTB 10,167 2.069 2.027 0.966 1.561 2.534 
Sales Growth 10,167 0.158 0.385 -0.006 0.089 0.218 
Intangible 10,167 0.053 0.114 0 0 0.052 
Leverage 10,167 0.291 0.261 0.098 0.245 0.405 
Pretax ROA 10,167 0.071 0.163 0.006 0.079 0.154 
Capital Expenditure 10,167 0.090 0.106 0.030 0.059 0.108 
 
  This table shows the descriptive statistics of the variables. All the variables are defined in Appendix A.    
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Table 4 Main Regressions 
 
 Unweighted Regressions Weighted Regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Current ETR GAAP ETR Cash ETR Current ETR GAAP ETR Cash ETR 
Constituency 0.0280** 0.00581 0.0255 0.0533** 0.0113 0.0540* 
  (2.557) (0.725) (1.460) (2.340) (0.819) (1.730) 
Size 0.0477*** 0.0259*** 0.0302** 0.0504*** 0.0300*** 0.0670*** 
 (6.771) (3.762) (1.977) (4.608) (2.741) (3.042) 
PP&E -0.0848*** -0.0259 -0.0163 -0.0910* -0.0848 -0.111 
 (-2.943) (-1.001) (-0.299) (-1.824) (-0.906) (-0.923) 
ΔNOL 0.610** -0.0497 1.980*** 0.539 1.386** 2.323* 
 (2.313) (-0.145) (3.380) (1.291) (2.057) (1.938) 
NOL -0.0782*** 0.00944 -0.0631*** -0.102*** -0.0103 -0.0434 
 (-7.303) (0.922) (-3.682) (-6.629) (-0.897) (-1.285) 
R&D 0.0173 -0.347** 0.476* -0.0908 -0.333 0.398 
 (0.163) (-2.121) (1.804) (-0.657) (-1.551) (1.023) 
MTB -0.00143 -0.00557*** -0.00625** -0.00115 -0.00319 -0.0142*** 
 (-1.120) (-2.728) (-2.131) (-0.535) (-0.631) (-2.946) 
Sales Growth 0.00501 -0.00703 -0.0520*** -0.00393 0.0422 -0.0236 
 (0.834) (-0.745) (-2.836) (-0.342) (1.052) (-0.822) 
Intangible 0.0238 0.0364 0.0701 0.0314 0.0162 0.0926 
 (0.621) (1.062) (1.309) (0.440) (0.286) (1.205) 
Leverage -0.0457*** 0.000801 0.00667 -0.0446** 0.0374 -0.128 
 (-2.825) (0.0494) (0.198) (-2.159) (0.991) (-1.603) 
Pretax ROA 0.211*** 0.457*** -0.375*** 0.234*** 0.359*** -0.323*** 
 (9.892) (12.03) (-5.895) (5.173) (3.399) (-2.871) 
Capital Expenditure 0.00221 -0.167*** 0.199*** 0.0613 -0.0482 0.379*** 
 (0.0564) (-5.105) (2.733) (0.967) (-0.618) (2.908) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Observations 10,167 9,162 5,355 10,167 9,162 5,355 
R-squared 0.125 0.079 0.027 0.126 0.063 0.020 
 
 
This table shows the unweighted/weighted regression results from estimating Equation (1). Dependent variables are Current ETR, GAAP ETR and Cash ETR, 
respectively. Results on fixed-effects are omitted for simplicity. T-stats are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, and * represent significance levels at 10%, 5% 
and 1%, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A.    
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Table 5 Financial Constraints Partitions 
 
 Financial Constraints (WW index) 
 Low  High 
Constituency 0.068** 0.036 
 (2.21) (1.54) 
Controls Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes 
Observations 5,069 5,068 
R-squared 0.054 0.167 
 
This table shows the weighted regression results from estimating Equation (1). The sample is partitioned into 
high/low financial constraints groups, using WW Index. The dependent variable is Current ETR. Results on control 
variables and fixed-effects are omitted for simplicity. T-stats are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, and * 
represent significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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Table 6 Retail Sector Partitions 
 Fama-French 12 Fama-French 17 
 Retail Non Retail Retail Non Retail 
Constituency 0.109*** 0.022 0.133*** 0.024 
 (3.59) (1.31) (3.06) (1.55) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,821 8,346 1,014 9,153 
R-squared 0.073 0.141 0.077 0.136 
 
This table shows the weighted regression results from estimating Equation (1). The sample is partitioned into retail/non retail groups, using Fama-French 12 and 
17 industry classifications. The dependent variable is Current ETR. Results on control variables and fixed-effects are omitted for simplicity. T-stats are reported 
in the parentheses. ***, **, and * represent significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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Table 7 Social Responsibility Partitions 
 
 State-Level Social Capital State-Level Organ Donation 
 Low High Low High 
Constituency 0.034 0.070** 0.033 0.065** 
 (1.53) (2.34) (1.50) (2.25) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,592 4,490 5,212 4,904 
R-squared 0.109 0.105 0.123 0.108 
 
This table shows the weighted regression results from estimating Equation (1). The sample is partitioned into high/low social responsibility groups, using data on 
state-level social capital and per capital organ donation (Hasan et al. 2017). The dependent variable is Current ETR. Results on control variables and fixed-effects 
are omitted for simplicity. T-stats are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, and * represent significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. All variables are 
defined in Appendix A. 
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Table 8 Prior Tax Avoidance Partitions 
 Prior Tax Avoidance 
 Low High 
Constituency -0.004 0.065*** 
 (-0.16) (3.63) 
Controls Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes 
Observations 3,502 2,858 
R-squared 0.087 0.1027 
   
 
This table shows the unweighted/weighted regression results from estimating Equation (1). The sample is partitioned 
into high/low prior tax avoidance groups, based on Fama-French 48 industries. The dependent variable is Current 
ETR. Results on control variables and fixed-effects are omitted for simplicity. T-stats are reported in the 
parentheses. ***, **, and * represent significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. All variables are defined 
in Appendix A. 
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Table 9 Anti-Takeover Law Falsification Test 
 
 Unweighted Weighted 
Anti-Takeover 0.016* 0.030 
 (1.72) (1.32) 
Controls Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes 
Observations 10,167 10,167 
R-squared 0.125 0.129 
   
This table shows the unweighted/weighted regression results from estimating Equation (1), with the variable of 
interest replaced based on the adoption of anti-takeover laws. The dependent variable is Current ETR. Results on 
control variables and fixed-effects are omitted for simplicity. T-stats are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, and * 
represent significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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Table 10 Parallel Trend Test 
 
 Unweighted Weighted 
Pre3 -0.004 -0.007 
 (-0.47) (-0.60) 
Pre2 0.002 0.016 
 (0.21) (0.95) 
Pre1 -0.011 -0.036** 
 (-1.23) (-2.59) 
Post1 0.014* 0.023 
 (1.66) (1.30) 
Post2 0.008 0.010 
 (0.91) (0.65) 
Post3 0.012* 0.005 
 (1.68) (0.46) 
Controls Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes 
Observations 10,167 10,167 
R-squared 0.126 0.130 
 
This table shows the unweighted/weighted regression results from estimating Equation (1), with the variable of 
interest replaced with the relative years around the adoption of anti-takeover laws. The dependent variable is Current 
ETR. Results on control variables and fixed-effects are omitted for simplicity. T-stats are reported in the 
parentheses. ***, **, and * represent significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. All variables are defined 
in Appendix A. 
 
